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Stavridis: Review Essay—A World Explored

A WORLD EXPLORED

James Stavridis

Kissinger, Henry. Does America Need a Foreign Policy?
Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2001. 318pp. $30

In this characteristically brilliant and challenging book, Henry Kissinger lays
out a proactive approach to building a coherent foreign policy for the United
States. Drawing upon a lifetime of extraordinary access and service—secretary
of state, national security advisor, Harvard professor, and 1973 Nobel Peace
Prize recipient—Kissinger uses an easy style that takes us rapidly around the
globe on a forceful and persuasive tour d’horizon. Indeed, Kissinger’s first and
until now best, book on the art and practice of diplomacy was A World Restored
(1957), an examination of Europe in the post-Napoleonic period. In Does
America Need a Foreign Policy? he sets out to give us what might be termed “a
world explored,” as he casts a wise and farseeing eye across the subject of modern
foreign policy.
Widely, if simplistically, known as the ultimate practitioner of realpolitik,
Kissinger contends that the United States must move to a more coherent, holistic
approach to its foreign policy. His opening chapter characterizes the two, often
conflicting, strands of U.S. diplomacy as “dual myths.” He first explores and dismisses the approach of the liberal Left, wherein the tradition of Woodrow
Wilson’s impulse to resolve the world’s domestic problems in a liberal-democratic
fashion is fully embodied. He then moves on to criticize the Jacksonian Right,
which sees in the collapse of the Soviet Union an opening for American hegemony—a view he regards as erroneous and dangerous. As Kissinger describes
the current state of debate, “such controversy on foreign policy . . . is divided between an attitude of missionary rectitude on one side and a sense that the accumulation of power is self-implementing on the other.
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After presenting a vision of the potential approaches to global policy, Kissinger
turns to dissecting the world regionally. He hypothesizes that four international
systems exist side by side in the world today. The first world enjoys an “idealist
version of peace based on democracy and economic progress,” found in the relations between the United States, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. The second
world is Asia, where the great powers—India, China, Japan, and Russia—treat
each other as strategic rivals, much in the way the nineteenth-century European
nations related to one another. In the Middle East, Kissinger sees a third world
that resembles the Europe of the seventeenth century, full of conflict based on
ideology and religion. The fourth and final world is in Africa, with over forty
nations caught in a spiral of savage civil wars, an overwhelming AIDS epidemic,
and vicious tribal conflict. Kissinger’s predictions for each of these four worlds
are central to this fascinating volume, and, while too detailed and numerous to
discuss here, if taken together would form the basis for developing a sound
foreign policy indeed.
Interestingly, Kissinger believes that the fundamental reason for the current
strains and inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy is that three generations of
planners are involved: Cold War strategists, formed in the crucible of a bipolar
world; a Vietnam generation of former protestors; and a post–Cold War generation, with entirely different experiences in an increasingly chaotic and multilateral world, seeking to enshrine globalism as a central organizing principle for
the international environment. Given the intergenerational conflicts among
these three groups, it is no wonder that U.S. foreign policy at times seems adrift.
Two criticisms are worth mentioning. The first falls out of the premise of
Occam’s Razor, that the simplest solution tends to be the correct one. At times,
Kissinger seems to overcomplicate and overreach in attempting to describe the
world in systemic ways. It may well be that the world is now so chaotic and prone
to high-speed turns that sweeping strategic planning may have lost some of its
utility. While it is clearly unwise to sing a requiem for strategic global planning,
there is something to be said for an approach that hones our tactical skills—quick
responses to emerging diplomatic crises—even as we continue to seek organizing principles and broader planning constructs.
A second criticism of the work notes Kissinger’s surprising lack of attention
to the extraordinary cultural dominance of the United States and to the implications of that important trend. Of particular interest is U.S. dominance in film,
television, the Internet, and other visual media for information and ideas, so
significant in an increasingly image-based world. Kissinger touches on this at
points, commenting that “the question arises of whether the new ways of processing information may not actually inhibit our capacity to learn in the field of
international relations.” One wishes he had more fully explored this fascinating
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idea, which is tied directly to the larger question of the transition from a
print-based informational and educational system to a far more visually structured approach.
This is a volume full of superb advice for the statesman. When Kissinger
writes that “the successful conduct of foreign policy demands, above all, the
intuitive ability to sense the future and thereby to master it,” he underscores the
difficulty of strategic planning in today’s chaotic and unbalanced world. If the
United States cannot discern the future, it will indeed be difficult, if not impossible, for the nation to master it. Kissinger is on the most solid ground in saying that “leadership is the art of bridging the gap between experience and
vision”—excellent advice for planners and policy makers in today’s world. He
may be thinking of more than the Balkans when he opines that “the ultimate
dilemma of the statesman is to strike a balance between values and interests and,
occasionally, between peace and justice.”
In the end, the heart of this book is Kissinger’s deterministic view of the
world, grounded in moral conservatism—a quite solid basis for viewing a dangerous environment. He rejects utopian visions on both sides of the political
spectrum and sees the past as a long journey through an unsafe land—logically
enough, given his sense of history and his own immigrant experience. For Henry
Kissinger, choices are hard and progress is difficult. We live in a world in which
America should savor the small victories, because the big ones may never come.
Yet for all the inherent pessimism of that vision, there is a subtle sense of enjoyment of the game and a belief that right and justice have at least a fighting
chance.
Kissinger points out that “America’s preeminence is often treated with indifference by its own people.” The superb overview of the U.S. global situation that
he provides in this work is a helpful, informative, and challenging antidote to
such national apathy. Clearly, Henry Kissinger is a statesman still in intellectual
command of the complex world he inhabits.
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